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I. Introduction
At the end of 1982 Brazil was close to declare its international
insolvency. After Mexico stopped to repay its external debt in
autumn of that year the commercial banks confidence also in Bra-
zil's creditworthiness declined rapidly. Within not quite a de-
cade the country's external debt had increased from US-$ 12.7
billions in 1973 to US-$ 70.7 billions in 1982 while debt serv-
ices which amounted to 42.3 p.c. of total export earnings in 1975
rose to 70.8 p.c. in 1982 . In December 1982 the Brazilian gov-
ernment had to start negotiations with the IMF and up to 1984
seven adjustment arrangements were approved - but none of them
was actually met. Meanwhile Brazil has become increasingly reluc-
tant to accept the well-known IMF-cure and tries to achieve a re-
scheduling of its debt through direct negotiations with the com-
mercial banks.
This position in the debt dialogue is closely related to Brazil's
ability to achieve substantial surpluses in the trade balance in
the last few years (US-$ 6.5 billions in 1983, 13.1 billions in
1984 and 12.5 billions in 1985) which enabled it to pay at least
the interest on its external debt outstanding. However, these
surpluses were the result of sharp reductions of imports (-20.5
2
p.c. in 1983, -9.8 p.c. in 1984 and -5.2 p.c. in 1985) and also
the rapid growth of export of the previous years could not be
attained: Exports declined by 5.1 p.c. in 1985 after growth rates
of 8.6 p.c. and 23.3 p.c. were realized in 1983 and 1984. Main-
tenance of high rates of export growth is, however, essential to
restore the country's creditworthiness in international capital
markets and thus also to improve its long term growth prospects.
This paper has the intention to judge the prospects for further
export growth based on an analysis of Brazil's export performance
Data refer to debt with a maturity of more than one year (World
Bank, World Debt Tables).
2
In nominal terms.- 3 -
since the mid-sixties. Section II provides a brief overview of
Brazil's industrialization strategy and its trade policies to
which the evolution of its external debt problem is closely re-
lated. The overall performance of exports is discussed in section
III and in section IV the major determinants of manufactured
export performance are examined. In this context the analysis
concentrates on the role of exchange rate policy as well as other
policy measures to promote manufactured exports. Furthermore the
international competitiveness of the different branches of Bra-
zil's industrial sector is examined. The main findings are sum-
marized in section V.
II. Industrialization Strategy and Trade Policies
From the late forties until the early sixties Brazil's industri-
alization strategy heavily relied on import substitution policies
[Donges, Miiller-Ohlsen, 1978, p. 15]. During the whole period
exports were discriminated. The high protection of the domestic
market resulted in an overvaluation of the domestic currency
(Cruzeiro) and it increased the costs of inputs required in the
production of export goods. Thus at the end of the sixties the
country found itself in a precarious balance of payments po-:
sition. Foreign credit was hard to obtain [Baer, 1979, p. 119]
and the continuation of import substitution activities did not
lead to a significant reduction of imports; on the contrary im-
ports of intermediate inputs and capital goods had to be in-
creased. The shortage of foreign exchange became a major bot-
tleneck to economic development and the growth rate of GDP de-
clined drastically from 10.2 p.c. (1961) to 5.3 p.c. and 0.8 p.c.
in the following years.
Given this gloomy economic situation it was in 1964 when a new
government shifted policies to a more outward oriented develop-
ment approach and gave emphasis to the promotion of exports [Sa-
vasini, 1978, p. 9]. The measures applied were a major deval-
uation of the Cruzeiro as well as the introduction of indirect- 4 -
tax exemptions. At the end of the sixties the timidly started
policy was largely completed [Balassa, 1979, pp. 1024-1025].
Tariffs were reduced by about 50 p.c. in early 1967, export sub-
sidies were introduced in 1968 and a scheme of mini-devaluation
replaced the intermittent changes of the exchange rate . Brazil
experienced what now sometimes is called an "Economic Miracle":
Exports and GDP grew at an average annual rate of 14.3 p.c. and
9.3 p.c. in real terms, during the period from 1968 to 1973.
After the first oil price shock in 1973 the country returned to
an active import substitution policy. The higher oil prices
caused a drastic increase in the trade deficit from US-$ 62 mil-
lions in 1973 to US-$ 4.8 billions and 3.6 billions in 1974 and
1975, respectively. In the Second National Development Plan (1975
to 1979) large investments in pulp and paper, petrochemicals,
fertilizers, steel and non-ferrous metals were envisaged with the
target to approach self-sufficiency in these products by the end
of the decade [World Bank, 1983, pp. 44.-45]. Other measures to
cope immediately with the severe balance-of-payments problems
were tariff increases of 100 percentage points for 1200 items and
of 30 percentage points for another 800 items, increasing quanti-
tative restrictions as well as the introduction of a 100 p.c.
one-year deposit to be held for nearly one third of all imports
[Balassa, 1979, pp. 1030-1032]. On the export side the promotion
program of the previous period remained basically unchanged al-
though the relative importance of financial incentives increased
[World Bank, 1983, p. 45].
Obviously, these measures were not adequate to achieve an export
performance as in the period before: The growth rate of exports
declined drastically during 1973 to 1978 to an average annual-
rate of 6.0 p.c. The rate of growth of GDP, however, remained at
a relatively high level (7.1 p.c. on period average). Increasing
investments in the already mentioned import substituting activi-
This scheme was intended to prevent large variations in the
real exchange rate and thus to reduce uncertainty for exporters
as to the Cruzeiro equivalent of their foreign exchange
earnings.- 5 -
ties and also in infrastructure facilities raised the investment
ratio from 24.0 p.c. on the average of the period 1966 to 1973 to
28.4 p.c. during 1974 to 1978. But its financing was at the "ex-
pense" of increasing inflation and foreign indebtness. The latter
rose from US-$ 19.1 billions at the end of 1974 - thus including
already the indebtness due to higher oil prices - to US-$ 46.2
billions in 1978.
At the beginning of 1979 a policy program was adopted intending
to initiate steps for liberalizing the economy again. However,
this program did not survive the impact of the second oil price
increase and economic policy followed a "stop-and-go" approach.
The measures used to cope with the external imbalance and high
domestic inflation were a maxi-devaluation of the Cruzeiro vis-
&-vis the US-$ in December 1979, the removal of the prior deposit
scheme on imports, a one-step elimination of fiscal subsidies to
exports as well as the introduction of export taxes on major
export commodities. Despite a remarkable growth of exports in the
following year, 1980 ended with a another trade deficit of US-$
2.8 billions (US-$ 2.7 billions in 1979).
To stimulate exports at the beginning of 1981 the scheme of fre-
quent mini-devaluations at rates equal to the increase in con-
sumer prices as well as fiscal subsidies on exports were re-in-
troduced while import growth was tried to be dampened by a sur-
charge tax of 25 p.c. and by the intensification of import con-
trols. As a result of these measures and the reduction in domes-
tic absorption a trade surplus of US-$ 1.2 billions could be
achieved in 1981. However GDP declined by 1.6 p.c. and foreign
indebtness increased by another US-$ 18.1 billions, amounting now
to US-$ 64.3 billions. In 1982 finally problems on the external
position accumulated as exports fell by US-$ 3.2 billions (leap-
ing up the debt service ratio to nearly 71 p.c.), net internatio-
nal reserves turned negative [Bacha, 1983, p. 31] and new loans
from commercial banks were refused. Brazil, meanwhile the world
biggest debtor found itself unable to meet its international pay-
ment obligations.
Given this background information in the following the overall
export performance since the mid-sixties is discussed in detail._ 6 _
III. Growth and Structure Exports
a) Commodity Composition of Exports
Since the mid-sixties Brazil's total exports grew in real terms
at an average annual rate of 9.3 p.c. (1965-1982, table 1). This
average however masks that up to the first oil price shock export
growth was three-times higher than in the following sub-period
(1973 to 1982, table 1). Growth of primary commodities was just
one-fifth of that in the period before and growth of manufactured
exports declined from 34.6 p.c. to 13.0 p.c. It should be
stressed that the high rate of manufactured export growth during
1965 to 1973 also resulted from the fact that manufactured ex-
ports started from a very low level in 1965 (US-$ 79,5 millions).
Over time the commodity composition of exports changed drastical-
ly (table 1):
- The share of primary commodities in total exports declined
continuously from 94.3 p.c. (1965) to 65.5 p.c. in 1982. The
country's former dependence on coffee exports as the major
source of foreign exchange earnings also decreased substantial-
ly. While coffee in 1965 accounted for 44.3 p.c. of total ex-
ports its share fell to one-tenth in 1982. New products like
soybeans and their derivatives as well as petroleum and petro-
leum products became major export commodities.
- Manufactured exports as a share in total exports rose from 5.0
p.c. in 1965 to one-third in 1982. Machinery and equipment
became the most important export items, accounting in 1982 for
more than half of exports in manufactures. Measured on total
exports their share increased drastically from 1.8 p.c. in 1965
to 17.2 p.c. in 1982.
b) Regional Diversification of Exports
During 1965 to 1982 not only the composition of Brazil's exports
changed considerably but also their geographical distribution
(table 2). One of the most striking developments was the drastic
decline in the importance of the USA as one of Brazil's major- 7 -
Table 1 - Structure and Growth of Brazil's Exports 1965-1982
Cantnodity groups Share of total exports Average annual
growth rates
1965 1970 1975 1980 1982 1965-73 1973-82 1965-82
Primary Commodities 94.3 89.5 74.6 65.9 65.4 12.2 2.5 7.1
- Food items
(SITC 0+1+22+4) 67.3 63.3 54.1 46.3 39.6
(Coffee) (44.3) (35.9) (10.8) (13.8) (10.6)
- Agricultural raw




ferrous ores 9.0 9.9 12.0 8.9 10.0
(SITC 27+28)
- Fuels 0.0 0.6 2.3 1.8 7.2
(SITC 3)
- Iron and steel
and non-ferrous
metals 2.8 3.8 2.3 4.9 5.5
(SITC 67 + 68)
Manufactured goods 5.0 9.7 23.2 32.9 33.3 34.6 13.0 23.2
(SITC 5+6+7+8-67-68)
- Chemical products 0.9 1.4 2.1 3.6 4.5
(SITC 5)
- Basic manu-
factures 2.1 3.9 6.3 8.1 7.0
(SITC 6-67-68)
- Machinery and




articles 0.2 0.8 4.5 4.3 4.6
(SITC 8)
Unallocated 0.7 0.9 2.1 1.2 1.2
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 14.3 4.8 9.3
Current US-$ values deflated by the US wholesale price index as published in
the IMF, International Financial Statistics, Washington, 1984
Sources: UN, Handbook of International Trade and Development Statistics,
Washington, various issues; UN, Commodity Trade Statistics, Washington,
various issues.- 8 -
Table 2 - Direction of Brazil's Total Exports (percentages),
I 1965-1982
Destination



















Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Definitions of country groups as in IMF, Direction of Trade
Statistics, Washington 1983, Differences and additions as
follows:
2
Other Europe includes "Europe" as in IMF plus Austria,
Finland, Iceland, Norway, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland.
Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa.
4
Members are Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia,
Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela and
(Brazil).
Venezuela not included.
People's Rep. of China not included.
Includes People's Rep. of China, Hungary and
Romania.






























































export markets. Between 1965 and 1975 the share of the country's
exports to the USA halved to 15.4 p.c. and in 1982 it was still
11 percentage points lower than in 1965. Throughout the period
investigated the EEC proved to be the largest market for Bra-
zilian exports. The share of exports destined to this area rose
up to the first oil price shock to 37.3 p.c. Thereafter it fell
to 28.0 p.c. and stagnates at about the same level since then.
Furthermore, the share of exports to the other European countries
more than halved between 1970 and 1982. As far as trade with the
industrialized countries is concerned only exports to Japan have
risen markedly. On total the share of exports to the industria-
lized countries had decreased since 1965 by 17.4 percentage
points to 61.4 p.c. in 1982.
Accordingly Brazil's trade with other developing countries has
become much more intensive. Exports to these areas nearly doubled
from 15.3 p.c. in 1965 to 29.2 p.c. in 1982. Traditionally the
largest share of these exports was destined to the LAFTA member
countries which after the first oil price shock gained new im-
portance as export markets for Brazil. Since 1980 however exports
to the LAFTA are declining again. A major reason for the expan-
sion of Brazil's South-South-exports was the increasing pur-
chasing power of the oil exporting developing countries. But also
exports to other developing nations in the Middle East, Asia and
Africa have risen since 1965 by 6 percentage points, accounting
in 1982 for 8.5 p.c. of total exports.
Differentiating between manufactured and primary commodities some
interesting trends are observable as far as the destination of
exports is concerned (table 3):
- Up to the first oil price shock the share of manufactured ex-
ports to the industrialized countries increased by nearly 20
percentage points to 63.5 p.c. in 1973. Since then, however, it
declined continuously by the same amount, reaching 43.5 p.c. at
the beginning of the eighties. A considerable increase of this
share is observable again in 1982. This trend is also reflected
in the proportions of exports destined to the developing coun-
tries. Thus, in 1980/81 the relative importance of the deve-- 10 -






























































































1SITC 5 to 8 -(67+68). -
 2SITC 0 to 4 +(67+68).
Source: UN, Commodity Trade Statistics, various issues.
loped and the developing economies as Brazilian export markets
was- almost exactly the same as it was in 1965. Within the group
of the developing countries in 1965 the lion share of Brazil's
manufactured exports (more than 90 percent) was bought by the
LAFTA members. This was nearly half of total manufactured ex-
ports and during the period of trade liberalization up to the
first oil price shock this share declined to one quarter in
1973. Thereafter exports to the LAFTA market grew again,
raising the share of manufactured exports to this region to
nearly 40 percent in 1980/81. The latest data however suggest- 11 -
that again a redirection in manufactured exports towards the
industrialized countries has begun.
- In the exports of primary commodities to the industrialized
countries a declining trend is observeable, while the share of
these products sold to the developing countries rose from 13.6
p.c. in 1965 to 23.8 p.c. in 1982. Exports to the LAFTA members
decreased by 3.4 percentage points since 1965, which corre-
sponds to a decline of nearly 50 percentage points if measured
on primary exports to the developing countries.
c) Relative Importance in International Trade
Since the mid-sixties Brazil's total exports grew slightly faster
than world exports (16.1 p.c. compared to 14.2 p.c. on average of
1 the period 1965 to 1982) , rising its share in world exports from
0.83 to 1.09 (table 4). Its weight as an exporter from the devel-
oping countries has considerably increased up to 1973; the low
values thereafter reflect also the impact of the oil price in-
creases on these countries total exports. Compared with total
exports performance in manufactured exports was much better.
Brazil's share in world manufactured exports rose continuously
from almost nil in 1965 to 0.8 p.c. in 1981 and it is now one of
the major exporter of manufactures from the developing countries.
Table 4 - Brazil's Share in World Trade, 1965-1981
1965 1970 1973 1975 1979 1980 1982
Share in Total
World Exports 0.83 0.87 1.08 0.99 0.93 1.01 1.09
Share in Total Exports
from Developing
Countries 4.24 4.98 5.65 4.11 3.68 3.60 4.15
Share in World Exports.
of Manufactured Goods 0.09 0.15 0.35 0.45 0.57 0.65 0.69
Share in Exports of
Manufactured Goods
from Developing
Countries 2.03 2.96 4.99 6.67 6.34 6.91 6.33
1Defined as SITC 5+6-67-68+7+8
Sources: UN, Commodity Trade Statistics. New York, various issues
UN, Yearbook of International Trade Statistics; various
issues.
In nominal terms.- 12 -
Comparing Brazil with some other newly industrializing countries
(NICs) , table 5 shows that the country was still a very closed
economy at the beginning of the eighties. The progress it made in
integrating into the world economy was slow if measured by the
change in the share of exports to GDP since the mid-sixties. This
becomes especially evident if the country is compared with Korea
where policy attention also shifted from import substitution to a
more outward looking strategy in the first half of the sixties.
At that time Brazil's export ratio was even higher than that of
Korea, namely 6.5 p.c. compared to 5.8 p.c. .



















Ratios (exports to GDP) are three years averages for 1964 to
1966 and 1980 to 1982, respectively.
2
Based on average 1965 to 1967.
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics, Washington,
various issues. Council for Economic Planning and
Development, Taiwan Statistical Data Book, various
issues. World Bank, Handbook on National Accounts,
2nd Edition, Washington 1983.
Another comparison with Korea shows that in 1982 Korea's for-
eign debt as a percentage of GDP even exceeded that of Brazil
(32.6 p.c. compared to 25.2 p.c); however, Korea had no prob-
lems in obtaining external finance because of its superior
export performance. Its debt services amounted in 1982 to 14.3
p.c. of total exports while in the case of Brazil this ratio
was 70.8 p.c.r Weltwirtschaft
- 13 -
IV. Determinants of Export Performance
a) Diversification of Exports
The above section has shown that Brazil experienced considerable
changes in the composition of its exports as well as in their
regional distribution. These shifts could be expected to be im-
portant in explaining also why the country's weight in inter-
national trade has increased since the mid-sixties. The reason is
that e.g. a country able to supply quickly those goods which
experience growth in world demand higher than an average can also
be assumed to increase its share in world exports. The same is
true if it can quickly direct its exports to those regions were
income is growing faster than on world average. To assess quanti-
tatively the influence of these factors on the growth of Brazil's
exports a Constant-Market-Share (CMS)-analysis has been em-
ployed .
According to the CMS-analysis the difference between the actual
increase in a country's exports and that increase which would
have been necessary to keep its share in world exports constant
is splitted up in a (1) commodity composition effect, a (2) re-
gional concentration effect and a (3) residual. While (1) and (2)
represent the above mentioned demand factors, the latter factor
is generally referred to as the "competitiveness effect" and it
is assumed that it captures mainly changes on the supply side.
However it should be stressed that the actual value of the re-
sidual reflects the interaction of both demand and supply [Learner
•and Stern, 1970, pp. 175-176].
The CMS-analysis has been applied to the increase in Brazil's
total as well as manufactured exports, differentiating between
eight and three commodity groups, respectively and fourteen re-
2
gions . Two sub-periods,
01965 to 1973 and 1973 to 1981 were exa-
mined. The results reported in table 6 show
It should be noted that the CMS-analysis is based on an identi-
ty. As such it provides no explanation for the growth of ex-
ports. Instead it is a method which allows for a useful break-
down of the aggregate "export growth".
2
Defined as in UN, Yearbook of International Trade Statistics,
New York 1984.- 14 -
Table 6 - Results of a Constant Market Share Analysis to Brazil's
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Commodity groups SITC 0+1+22+4, 2 -(22+27+28), 3, 27+28, 67+68,
5, 6+8 -((67+68), and 7
Commodity groups SITC 5, 6 -(67+68)+8, 7.
Sources: UN, Commodity Trade Statistics. New York, various
issues. - UN, Yearbook of International Trade Statistics.
New York, various issues.
- that the largest share of Brazil's increase in total exports in
both sub-periods has to be attributed to the general increase
in world demand. However, the growing importance of this factor
in the period 1973 to 1981 indicates that Brazil's exports grew
slower relative to world exports than in the period before. In
both ° sub-periods the commodity composition of the country's- 15 -
total export supply proved to be a serious hindrance to a
higher export growth. This negative influence was especially
effective during 1973 to 1981 and it indicates that there were
many commodities in the export supply which faced a growth in
demand much slower than on world average. Contrary, in both
subperiods exports were mainly directed to regions where demand
was growing at roughly the same rate as on world average. The
observeable increase in Brazil's world market share during both
subperiods thus is mainly due to supply-side factors. The fa-
vourable influence of these factors, however, had diminished
after the first oil price shock.
- Brazil's manufactured exports during both sub-periods increased
at a rate much higher than what would have been required to
keep its world market share in these products constant. How-
ever, the importance of the world export trend as a factor
explaining the expansion of Brazil's manufactured exports in-
creased substantially during 1973 to 1981. Contrary to total
exports the commodity composition of manufactured exports was
in line with the growth of world demand in these products,
implying that the increase of Brazil's world market share in
manufactured exports cannot be attributed to a especially at-
tractive range of goods. The shift in the regional concentra-
tion of manufactured exports after the first oil price shock,
however, had a positive impact on manufactured export growth.
As in the case with total exports, the most important determi-
nant to which the rising share in world exports of manufactures
has to be attributed are supply-side factors. However, their
positive influence diminished substantially in the period 1973
to 1981 compared to the subperiod before.
The decline in the importance of these latter factors gives
reason to the assumption that after the first oil price shock
export growth especially in the case of manufactures was con-
strained by deteriorating supply conditions. For that reason, in
the following one of the major determinants of the international
price competitiveness of a country's exports - that is the real
exchange rate - will be subject to a closer examination.- 16 -
b) Exports and the Real Exchange Rate
To secure the international price competitiveness of a country's
exports changes in the nominal exchange rate should be sufficient
to correct for divergencies between the national and internatio-
nal price trend. Thus in the case were e.g. domestic inflation is
higher than inflation abroad a nominal depreciation of the do-
mestic currency to the amount of the differential inflation rate
would be necessary to keep the real exchange and thus price com-
petitiveness on foreign markets constant.
Table 7 presents indices of the inflation adjusted (real) ex-
change rate of the Cruzeiro vis-a-vis the currencies of Brazil's
major trading partner countries. First, export unit values were
used as proxies for export prices to "deflate" the nominal ex-
change rates. Export prices can be assumed to be the relevant
prices in assessing past performance on foreign markets because
they capture those goods which were actually traded [Maciejewski,
1983, p. 511, pp. 525-526]. The index in column 3 shows that the
Cruzeiro was undervalued in real terms during the late six-
ties/early seventies reaching its peak in 1971. In the following
years, however, nominal depreciations were mostly insufficient to
compensate for the diverging price trends domestically and
abroad. In 1977 the trend of real appreciations of the Cruzeiro
had resulted in an overvaluation of the Brazilian currency of
nearly 30 p.c. compared to 1965. Since that year, however, the
Cruzeiro depreciated continuously in real terms and in 1980 the
preceding overvaluation was eliminated.
A second index of the real exchange rate of the Cruzeiro was also
calculated by using wholesale prices as "deflators" (column 5) .
Contrary to the export unit value index the wholesale price index
actually measures price changes and because of its broader cover-
age it also reflects price developments for potentially export-
able goods. However, it should be kept in mind that this index
also includes the price trends of nontraded goods as well as im-
ported goods used for domestic consumption [Maciejewski, 1983,
pp. 516-527], Column 5 shows that the Cruzeiro was permanently
overvalued in real terms during the second half of the sixties as
well as over the whole period of the seventies if compared with- 17 -
Table 7 - Indices of the Real Exchange Rate of the Cruzeiro,


































































































































































Computations vis-ai-vis the currencies of Brazil's major
trading partners: USA, Germany, Argentina, Italy, Nether-
lands, U.K., Japan, France and Spain. Bilateral trade
weights were used; for 1965/72 and 1973/80 from Cardoso
11985), for recent years own calculations.
Subsidy rates for 1965 to 1978 were taken from Musalem
il981); for 1979 to 1981 from Horta (1983).
IMF, International Financial Statistics, various issues,
n.a.: not available
its 1965-value. Between 1966 and 1976 the Cruzeiro appreciated -
modestly - by about 9 p.c. Thereafter this trend was reversed by
nominal depreciations sufficient to depreciate the Cruzeiro also
in real terms over the last years of the seventies and to elimi-
nate the existing overvaluation in 1980. After a substantial real
appreciation in 1981 a major devaluation in February 1983 as well
as frequent mini-devaluations again overcompensated the preceding
appreciation.
In determining the international competitiveness not only ex-
change rate policies matter, however, but also other incentives• - 18 -
provided to exporters. In the case of Brazil subsidies played a
major and increasingly important role since the outward orienta-
tion of the mid-sixties in stimulating manufactured exports.
According to the estimates of Musalem (1981) and Horta (1983) the
local currency remuneration per unit of foreign exchange earned
through exports was increased through subsidies by 5 p.c. in 1965
and this percentage rose continuously to 74 p.c. in 1976. In 1980
when the export tax credit (credito pre"mio) was abolished the
subsidy rate still amounted to 59 p.c. and with its re-introduc-
tion in 1981 the rate increased to 67 p.c. Basically these in-
centives allow for a reduction of the domestic currency export
price. Thus, at the prevailing exchange rate it may be that some
high-cost producing firms can compete on international markets
only because of these subsidies. Firms, however, already compe-
titive on world markets may simply use the assistance provided to
increase their profits.
Taking into account these subsidies the real effective exchange
rate index based on export prices largely ifollows the movement of
that one without subsidies. However, it also indicates that an
exporter's real domestic currency remuneration per unit of
foreign exchange earned was permanently higher than in 1965. In
1977, when the index without subsidies indicates the highest
overvaluation of the Cruzeiro during the whole period (28.8 p.c.)
the index including subsidies still shows an undervaluation of
16.4 p.c; meaning that an exporter received for one unit of
foreign exchange in real terms 16.4 p.c. more than in 1965. Be-
tween 1971 and 1977, however, the undervaluation of the Cruzeiro
decreased and it is difficult to assess whether this trend had
adversely affected manufactured exports or not. Turning to the
index based on wholesale prices, with the inclusion of subsidies
the real domestic currency remuneration per unit of foreign ex-
change has increased since 1966 - a fact which should have been
favourable to the growth of manufactured exports.
In order to assess the importance of the exchange rate/incentive
policies for the export performance of manufactured goods an
export supply function of the following form has been estimated:- 19 -
^ = a + b lnRt + c lnPfc + d lnU. + e
g
were X = real manufactured exports, R = index of the real ex-
change rate (excluding and including subsidies) P = index of
manufacturing output, U = rate of industrial capacity utiliza-
tion, t = time and e = the error term. Under the assumption that
Brazil is a small country with respect to the exportation of
manufactured goods the export supply function is statistically
identified and thus can be estimated with OLS. Changes in the
real exchange rate R then cause shifts in the perfectly elastic
demand curve and these shifts trace out the export supply func-
tion [Tyler, 1976, p. 306]. Over the period discussed Brazil has
experienced a considerable growth of manufactured output which
can also be expected to have increased the export supply. To
cover these potential rightward shifts in the export supply func-
tion the variable P has been introduced. Furthermore, it has been
argued by various authors [e.g. Donges, Miiller-Ohlsen 1978, pp.
141-142; Tyler 1976, pp. 265-266; Pomfret 1975, pp. 469-470] that
the rate of capacity utilization (U) is an important determinant
of manufactured export behaviour. It is hypothesized that in
periods of slacking domestic demand firms try to compensate for
the decline in domestic sales through increased efforts to export
while in boom periods production is mainly sold on the domestic
market. Thus, the expected sign of d is negative, while b and c
are expected to be positive related with the export supply.
Equation (1) has been estimated for the period 1965 to 1981 by
using indices of the real exchange rate of the Cruzeiro excluding
and including subsidies . In the first case when subsidies were
The indices are those reported in table 7, column 5 and 6. They
were computed by using wholesale prices as "deflators" and they
were used in the regression because real manufactured exports
had been also calculated by deflating with the Brazilian whole-
sale price index. This latter index is assumed to be more ap-
propriate than export unit values in calculating real manufac-
tured exports because export unit values also capture the price
trend of too many non-manufactured exports. The index of manu-
factured output for 1965 to 1980 had been taken from World Bank
(1983, p. 156) and updated from "Conjuntura" (1985). The rate
of capacity utilization for 1968 to 1981 is also from World
Bank (1983, p. 162); the values for 1965 to 1967 had been esti-
mated as the ratio of actual manufactured output to the time
trend of manufactured production.- 20 -
not taken into account the regression analysis yielded the fol-
lowing results:
(la) lnX^ = - 6.456 + 3.209 lnR* +3.050 lnP** - 3.967 fc
(2.15) (13.88) (-1.28)
R
2 = 0.93 (F(3.13) = 68.73 D.W. = 1.85
t-statistics in brackets; *significant at the ten-percent
level; **significant at the one-percent level (two-tailed
t-test)
These results suggest that the real exchange rate has been an im-
portant determinant of Brazil's export performance in manufac-
tures. The estimated parameter indicates that e.g. a real de-
preciation of the Cruzeiro by one percent would have resulted in
an increase of manufactured exports by 3.2 percent. Also the
expansion of manufactured production had a strong and positive
influence on manufactured exports. The recession-boom variable U
has the expected sign but it proved to be insignificant in ex-
plaining manufactured export behaviour.
Turning to the estimation of (1) but using the the real effective
exchange rate - that is the real exchange rate taking into ac-
count subsidies - as an explanatory variable of the export be-
haviour, the following results were obtained :
(lb) lnX^ = -2.068 + 2.363 lnRt + 2.248 lnP* - 4.242 lnUt
(1.04) (2.61) (-1.02)
R2 = 0.83 F (3.12) = 26.09 D.W. = 1.76
t-statistics in brackets; *significant at the five percent
level (two-tailed t-test).
Surprisingly the real effective exchange Irate was insignificant
in explaining the export performance in manufactures. The same is
true for the rate of capacity utilization (recession-boom effect)
while the increase in manufacturing output had a significant
positive influence on manufactured exports. One explanation why
Because of serious autocorrelation of the error term the esti-
mation technique used was the Cochrane-Orcutt iterative method.- 21 -
the real effective exchange rate could not be found to be sig-
nificantly correlated with manufactured exports may be that sub-
sidies were mainly taken by firms already competitive internatio-
nally and thus may have resulted primarily in an increase in
profits of these firms. In that way they would have been an inef-
fective but costly mean (e.g. in terms of their budget- and allo-
cational implications) to promote exports. Another reason, how-
ever, why the real effective exchange rate was insignificant in
explaining manufactured export performance may be seen in the
fact that subsidies were highly uneven distributed among the
industrial sector. This is the case e.g. with the export incen-
tive scheme BEFIEX which was started in 1972 and which has become
the most important program providing enterprise-specific import
duty reductions and exemptions. In 1979 and 1980 only 59 and 100
firms, (concentrated in the capital goods industries - especially
the automobile sector) benefitted from this program. Out of the
cumulative export commitments under BEFIEX (up to 1980) 49,2 p.c.
were given to the sector "transport equipment" followed by
"metals" and "machinery" with 23.5 and 10.3 p.c, respectively
[World Bank, 1983, pp. 53-62]. Furthermore, the export tax credit
certificates (credito pre"mio) granted were also highly concentra-
ted on a few sectors: on the average 1978/79 the lion share was
provided to the sector "transport equipment" (29.1 p.c), fol-
lowed by the sectors "food" (14.7 p.c.) machinery (13.8 p.c),
"metals" (13.3 p.c.) and "textiles" (12.6 p.c.) [World Bank,
1983, pp. 204-205].
Thus contrary to the real effective exchange rate, changes in the
real exchange rate (which does not take into account subsidies)
affect at the same rate the different branches across the indu-
strial sector and this may help to explain why only the latter
was found to be a statistically significant determinant of manu-
factured export behaviour.
c) International Competitiveness and Structure of Specialization
of the Industrial Sector
Having examined the global competitiveness of Brazil's manufac-
turing sector which is largely determined by the real exchange
rate in the following the relative competitiveness of the dif-- 22 -
ferent industrial branches is investigated. An often used method
to obtain information on this issue is the "Revealed-Comparative-
Advantage (RCA)"-analysis. The basic idea of this concept is that
the international competitiveness of a specific branch is "re-
vealed" by the excess of its exports over its imports. If total
net exports of the manufacturing sector are used for standardiz-
ing, the so computed RCA-values provide information on the rela-
tive competitiveness of a specific branch, that is relative to
the average industrial activity. Thus, the RCA-analysis allows
for a ranking of the different branches with respect to their
international competitive position.
The RCA-concept has often - as the term suggests - been associa-
ted with comparative advantages which according to the pure
theory of international trade are assumed to determine the struc-
ture of production and thus also trade patterns. In a perfectly
competitive world it can be expected that the RCA-values ap-
proximate the "true" comparative advantages of the country in-
vestigated. However if there are serious distortions in goods and
factor markets the international competitiveness of a specific
branch "revealed" by the RCA-value may be resulting from these
distortions rather than from "true" comparative advantages. To
draw any conclusions with respect to the question of future spe-
cialization patterns on the basis of these values would then be
grossly misleading. In the case of Brazil the distortions caused
by subsidies and tariffs in the commodity market alone can be
assumed to be quite substantial: According to World Bank esti-
mates the incentive system had resulted in 1980 e.g. in a pro-
export bias for the sector transport equipment of 39.9 p.c.
(total export incentives minus implicit nominal protection) while
at the other extreme an anti-export bias of -78.8 p.c. existed in
the case of Pharmaceuticals [World Bank, 1983, p. 83].
Table 8 reports the RCA values of 47 branches of Brazil's indu-
strial sector in their trade with the world for selected years
during the period 1965 to 1982 . The most important findings can
The formula used for computation is given in the appendix. It
restricts the possible values to the interval [-100, 100]. A
positive value for a specific branch indicates that its inter-
national competitiveness was stronger than on average of the
industrial sector and vice versa.- 23 -




1970 1975 1980 1982
Food
01 Meat and raflat preparations
022-024 Dairy products
053 Fruit, preserved and fruit preparations
054.6 + Vegetables frozen and vegetable pre-
055 served or prepared
03 Fish and fish preparations
042 Rice
046 Meal and flour of wheat
047 Meal and flour of cereals
048 Cereal preparations
06 Sugar preparations and honey
071.3 Coffee extracts, and similar preparations
of coffee
07 2.2,3 + Cocoa powder, -butter and -paste and
073 chocolate
411 Animal oils and fats
421 Fixed vegetable oils, soft
422 Other fixed vegetable oils
091.4 + Margarine and food preparations,
099 n.e.s.
Beverages and tobacco
111 Non-alcoholic beverages, n.e.s.
112 Alcoholic beverages
122 Tobacco manufactures
Textiles, clothing, footwear and leather
products




61 Leather, leather manufactures, n.e.s. and
dressed fur skins
83 Travel goods, handbags and similar articles
Wood products; furniture
63 Wood and Cork manufactures
(excluding furniture)
82 Furniture
64 Paper, paperboard and manufactures thereof
Chemical, and rubber products
51 Chemical elements and compounds
53 Dyeing, tanning and colouring materials
56 Fertilizers, manufactured
57 Explosives and pyrotechnic products
58 Plastic materials
59 Chemical materials and products, n.e.s.
54 Medicinical and pharmaceutical products
55 Essential oils and perfume materials
52 Mineral tar and crude chemicals from coal,
petroleum and natural gas
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1970 1975 19P0 1982
66 Non-metallic mineral manufactures, n.e.s. -43.1
Metals and metal products
67 Iron and steel
68 Non-ferrous metals
69 Manufactures of metal, n.e.s.
Machinery and transport equipment
71 Machinery, other than electric




81 Sanitary, plumbing, heating and lightinq
fixtures and fittings 100.0
86 Professional, scientific and controlling
instruments; photographic and optical goods;
watches and clocks -93.3
89 Miscellaneous manufactured articles, n.e.s. -60.9




















































9.6 61.0 78.8 73.6
-92.6 -78.6 -60.8 -39.2
-41.6 -2.3 -4.0 3.7
Source: UN, Commodity Trade Statistics, various issues.- 25 -
be summarized as follows:
- The relative competitiveness of many branches of the (natural)
resource-intensive food industry was strong since 1965 (e.g.
production and/or processing of meat, fruits, sugar, coffee and
cocoa). The same holds for the production of non-alcoholic
beverages as well as for the tobacco industry. Some products
that were not traded at the beginning of the period investi-
gated quickly proved to be competitive on world markets (e.g.
oil from soya beans, SITC 421 and non-alcoholic beverages, SITC
111). Also the (natural) resource-intensive industries pro-
ducing wood and core manufactures as well as furniture had a
strong international standing. Their relative competitiveness,
however, has declined compared to 1965. Contrary, in the case
of paper production disadvantages in competitiveness continu-
ously diminished and a positive RCA-value was measured in 1982.
- International competitiveness was well above-average also in
the relatively labour-intensive producing industries (e.g. pro-
duction of textiles, clothing, footwear, leather articles and
travel goods). However, a declining trend is observable in the
case of textiles, clothing and leather articles.
- The majority of the branches of the relatively capital-in-
tensive producing chemical industry in 1982 still had competi-
tive disadvantages in trade with the rest of the world. How-
ever, in all of these cases disadvantages have diminished since
1965. Only the case of rubber were a positive RCA-value has
been measured in 1965 a substantial decline in competitiveness
is observable.
- In the production of metals and metal products, machinery and
transport equipment as well as other manufactured articles
competitiveness on world markets has improved considerably in
almost all branches. Six out of the 9 branches analyzed had
competitive advantages in 1982 compared to only two in 1965.
Whether the improvements in competitiveness especially in those
branches which are assumed to produce relatively capital-inten-
sive are mainly the result of trade policy measures or whether
the primarily reflect the accumulation of real- and human capital
and thus are the result of a changing factor endowment is diffi-
cult to assess and deserves further analyses. However an indica-- 26 -
tion that trade policy measures and trade performance of the
different branches are closely related can be seen in the high
correlation between the World Bank estimates of net incentive
ratios (total export incentives minus implicit nominal protec-
tion; [World Bank, 1983, p. 83] for 19 industries and the cal-
culated RCA-values for these various sub-sectors: the correlation
coefficient between these variables is 0.61 and it is significant
at the three-percent level. Another indication is the superior
export performance of the automobile sector which was heavily
subsidized under the BEFIEX program. In 1971 the share of "road
motor vehicles" (SITC 732) just amounted to 3.3 p.c. of total
manufactured exports. One year later however when the BEFIEX
scheme was introduced this share had more than doubled to 7.6
p.c. and in 1982 automobiles already amounted to one-sixth (16.7
p.c.) of total manufactured exports.
Summary
During the late sixties/early seventies Brazil gradually opened
its economy and high rates of income- and export growth could be
achieved. Not only did the country's dependence on exports of
primary commodities reduce significantly, but also their geo-
graphical distribution changed markedly. This is especially true
in the case of manufactured exports. The share of these exports
destined to the industrialized countries rose by nearly 20 per-
centage points while the importance of the LAFTA as a major mar-
ket for Brazilian manufactured exports declined substantially.
After the oil price shock which resulted in serious balance-of-
payments problems a reduction in domestic absorption was not
regarded by the government as an appropriate mean to adjust to
the new situation. Instead the country returned to increasing
protectionism and relatively high rates of economic growth could
be attained only at the expense of fast growing foreign indebted-
ness and inflation. At the same time the growth of exports de-
clined rapidly and the direction in trade with manufactured ex-
ports reversed. As a result proportions of these exports to the
industrialized and the developing countries at the beginning of- 27 -
the eighties were the same as in 1965.
During the period discussed the real exchange rate of the Cru-
zeiro proved to be an important determinant of manufactured ex-
port behaviour. However, despite the fact the high export subsi-
dies were provided - especially during the seventies - they could
not be found to be statistically significant in explaining the
overall export performance in manufactured goods. Nevertheless
subsidies seem to have been very effective in specific cases
(e.g. in the automobile sector) to promote these exports.
This observation raises some questions which may be the starting
point for further research. First, if export subsidies are re-
garded as a mean to promote manufactured exports an important
issue remains with their distribution among the different indu-
strial sub-sectors. With respect to the allocational consequences
of this policy the most efficient way would be to apply the same
(net)incentive rate to all export activities leaving market for-
ces to determine their final distribution. In the case of Brazil,
however, the subsidies provided were heavily concentrated among a
few sectors - most important in the case of the automobile sector
- and this observation causes serious doubts on the economic
rationality of the export promotion policy.
A second related aspect is that export promotion via the pro-
vision of subsidies cannot be maintained indefinitely. Despite
allocational distortions it causes, it involves also inflationary
pressures because of its budget implications. Therefore what
would be the superior strategy of export promotion is the spe-
cialization in the production of those goods were comparative
advantages exist. As already mentioned heavy investments were
done in some capital-intensive activities after the first oil
price shock. Its international competitive position however has
been shown still to be weak in the early eighties despite the
incentive policies pursued. Thus by providing high export incen-
tives to presumably inefficient industries substantial welfare
losses may be incurred because these costs are not seen quickly
and easily as a good export performance may occur as well [Tyler,
1976, p. 223].- 28 -
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Appendix
1. The Constant-Market-Share (CMS) analysis is based on the fol-
lowing identity:
(II x]. - II X?.) - II rX?. = II(r. - r)X?.
+ n,^ - x°. - r.^,
where X '. . = value of exports of commodity i to region j in
the end year or base year of the period
investigated
r = growth rate of total world exports
r. = growth rate of world exports of commodity i
r.. = growth rate of world exports of commodity i to
-* regions j (without the country investigated)
2. Computations on indices of the real exchange rate of the Cru-
zeiro are based on the following formula:
E. .P. . BTW.
ll l
i=l P
R = Real exchange rate of the Cruzeiro
E. = Nominal Exchange rate (Cruzeiro per unit of
trading partner i's currency)
P = Price Index for Brazil
P. = Price index for trading partner country i
BTW = Bilateral trade weight; Brazilian exports
to trading partner i as a percentage of Brazil's
total exports.31
3. The Revealed-Comparative Advantage (RCA) analysis has been













































and x. = exports of commodity j
m. = imports of commodity j